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Summary findings
Michalopoulos  analyzes  how changes  in thinking  about  with the international  trading  system.  In addition,  an
the role trade plays  in economic  development  have  been  effective  system  of graduation  should be put in place  for
reflected  in provisions  affecting  developing  countries  in  higher-income  developing  countries.
the GATT  and the WTO. He focuses  on the provisions  Developing  countries  find  it politically  easier  to argue
calling  for the special  and differential  treatment  of  that all should  be treated the same,  except  for least
developing  countries.  developed  countries,  although  their capacities  and need
The WTO's special  and differential  treatment  has  been  for assistance  differ vastly.  Industrial  countries  are
extended  to include  measures  of technical  assistance  and  expected  to provide  special  and differential  treatment,
extended  transition  periods to enable  countries  to meet  but in practice  their commitments  on market  access,
their commitments  in new areas  agreed on in the  preferential  treatment,  and technical  assistance  are not
Uruguay  Round of negotiations.  enforceable.  Leaving  it up to the industrial  countries  to
At the same  time, many WTO provisions  encourage  decide  which  developing  countries  get preferential
industrial  countries  to give  developing  countries  treatment  invites  extraneous  considerations  in
preferential  treatment  through a variety  of measures,  determining  who gets  how much special  treatment.
none of them legally  enforceable.  Unless  higher-income  developing  countries  accept  some
Michalopoulos  concludes  that weaknesses  in the  type of graduated  differentiation  in their treatment
institutional  capacity  of many developing  countries  (beyond  that granted  the least developed  countries),
provide  a conceptual  basis  for continuing  special  and  there is little prospect of implementing  meaningful,
differential  treatment  in the WTO, but that the benefits  legally  enforceable  special  and differential  treatment
should be targeted only  to low-income  developing  favoring  all developing  countries  under the WTO.
countries  and those that need help becoming  integrated
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and challenges  for  better  integration  of developing  countries  into  the world  trading  system.  Copies  of  the paper are available
free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington,  DC 20433. Please  contact Lili  Tabada, room MC3-333,
telephone  202-473-6896, fax 202-522-1159, email address Itabada@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are
also posted  on  the Web  at  www.worldbank.org/research/workingpapers.  The  author may be  contacted at
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In the last fifty years, the rules affecting developing country participation in  the multilateral trade system
have evolved,  as has the thinking about the nature of trade policies appropriate for development. This
paper reviews how concerns about development  have been addressed within the GATT and subsequently
the  WTO. Its  objective  is to  trace the  evolution of the  principles  of participation  of the  developing
countries in the GATT, and later the WTO, and to link this evolutionto  the changing consensus on the
international trade  policies that may  be conducive to development. Particular  attention  is given to the
concept  of  differential  and  more  favourable  treatment  for  developing  countries  (Special  and
Differential-or  S&D)  in  the  context  of their  rights  and  obligations  in  the  GATT/WTO  and  to  its
changing content and emphasis over time.
Section II  reviews the main  principles and practices of developing country participation  in the GATT
from  its  establishment  through  the  mid-1980's,  and  links  them  to  concerns  about  the  relationship
between trade and development prevailing during this period. Section  III discusses developing country
participation  in  the Uruguay  Round (UR)  as well  as the  Round's  significance  for  the  treatment  of
development issues within the WTO.  Sections IV-VI focus on special and differential treatment issues in
favour of developing countries in general and  the Least Developed Countries (LDC) in particular, the
manner in which they have been addressed in the WTO and the priorities for their future implementation.II. Principles and Practices of Developing Countries in the GATT, 1947-1986
A. Trade and Development in the  Early GATT'
When the GATT was established  in  1947, 11 of the  original 23  contracting  parties would have  been
considered  developing  countries2 -although  at the  time, there was no  formal  recognition of such a
group, nor were there  any special provisions or exceptions in the agreement that covered their rights or
obligations.  Indeed,  the fundamental  principle  of the  original  agreement  was  that  the  rights  and
obligations  applied  uniformly  to  all  contracting  parties. The preamble  to  the  agreement  stressed  the
importance of substantially reducing discriminatory treatment andemphasised  reciprocal  and mutually
advantageous arrangements (GATT,  1948). No principles applying specifically to developing  countries
existed in the GATT  at the time of its inception. However, the draft charter ofthe  International Trade
Organisation  (ITO), which  was never  ratified, contained  a  provision under  which  contracting  parties
could  use  protective  measures  for  the  establishment,  development  or  reconstruction  of  particular
industries or branches of agriculture contrary to their obligations, provided they obtained the permission
of the other contracting parties.3
Today developing countries probably account for over two thirds of the 135 Members of the World Trade
Organisation; and the WTO agreements contain a very extensive set of provisions addressing the rights
and obligations of developing and least developed countries. Despite these extensive references,  there is
still  no  official  definition  of  what  constitutes  a  "developing  country".  Rather,  countries  use  the
designation on the  basis of self  selection. As a consequence,  Singapore with a  per  capita income of
$32,810  in 1997 and Ghana with a per capita income of $390 (World Bank, 1999b) are  both supposed
to benefit from the same provisions. On the other hand, there is as UN designated official list of 48 Least
Developed Countries (LDCs) of which 29 are currently members of the WTO.
While the original GATT contained no explicit provisions regarding developing countries, soon thereafter
developing  countries  started  to  raise  concerns  and  identify  special  challenges  that  they  faced  in
international trade.  The starting point of their concerns was that sustainable  increases in income and
output could 'only be  brought about through increased industrialisation. In most countries  there was a
'  This section of the  paper draws in part on material from 'Developing  Countries  and the Multilateral  Trading
System: Past and Present', background  Note by the WTO Development  Division prepared for the High Level
Symposium  on Trade Development,  Geneva,  March 17-18,  1999  and information  prepared  for that paper by Amar
Breckenridge.
2These  were Brazil,  Burma,  Ceylon,  Chile,  China,  Cuba,  India,  Lebanon,  Pakistan,  Rhodesia  and Syria.
2consensus that liberal trade policies would not promote industrialisation and  development because of the
then prevailing patterns of international specialisation: developing countries tended to specialise in raw
materials and primary commodity exports, which  were characterised by low price and incomeelasticities
of  demand  as  well  as  considerable  price  volatility;  while  they  were  dependent  on  imports  for
manufactures,  especially  capital  goods  and  intermediate  inputs  needed  for  investment  and
industrialisation. It was felt that liberal  trade policies would stymie the development of infant industries,
while  the continued  dependence on  primary  commodity and  raw materials  exports  would result  in
volatile export  earning  and deteriorating terms of trade (Prebisch, 1950; Singer, 1950). Moreover, it was
thought  that  the  development process  tended to  be  inherently associated with  balance  of  payments
difficulties which  could be addressed in the short term through trade controls. The trade strategy that
emerged from this thinking and which was practised by most developing countries at the timeemphasised
three main strands:
*  the promotion of industrialisation through import substitution behind protective tariff and non tariff
barriers;
e  the promotion of exports of manufactures aimed at diversifying the export structure  in part  through
export  subsidies,  perceived  as necessary  to  offset  advantages  of  established  developed  country
producers;
- the use of trade controls in response to actual or potential balance-of-payments difficulties.
The trade strategies pursued by developing countries during this early period  gave rise to  requests for
changes in the multilateral trading system in four main areas: (i)  improved market access for developing
country exports of manufactures to developed markets,  through the provision of trade  preferences, in
order to overcome the inherent disadvantages developing countries were facing in breaking  into these
markets; (ii)  non reciprocity, or less than full reciprocity, in trade relations between developing countries
and developed countries, in order to permit developing countries to maintain protection that was deemed
necessary to promote development; and (iii)  flexibility in the application by developing country members
of GATT, and later WTO, disciplines, for the same reason; (iv) stabilisation of world commodity markets.
3 This  provision  was introduced  as an amendment  to the GATT  in 1948.
3B. The GATT and Developing Countries, 1954-1986
The manner  in which  the  international community sought to  accommodate the  specific  concerns of
developing countries in the period between the early 1950s and the 1980s was heavily influenced by the
consensus prevailing at the time regarding the type of trade strategy  best suited to meeting development
objectives. Throughout  this period,  developing countries sought to emphasise the  uniqueness of their
development problems and challenges and the need to be treated differently and more  favourably in the
GATT, in part  by  being  permitted not to  liberalise their  own  trade  and  in part by  being  extended
preferential access to developed country markets.
The 1954-55 GATT review session was the first occasion on which provisions were adopted to address
the needs of developing countries  as a group within the GATT. Three main provisions were agreed, two
of them relating to Article XVIII.  Reflecting the argument that developing country members would face
balance-of-payments instability over an extended period of time, Article XVIII (B) was revised to include
a specific provision  to  allow countries at 'an early  stage of their development' to  adopt quantitative
restrictions  on  imports whenever  monetary reserves  were deemed to  be  inadequate  in terms  of the
country's long term development strategy. 
4 Article XVIII (C) was revised to allow for the imposition of
trade  restrictions (both tariffs and quantitative restrictions) to support infant  industries with a view to
raising living standards. And a provision granting the right of veto to certain affected contracting parties
was deleted, thus making the imposition of quantitative restrictions easier (GATT, 1954).
Commodity issues were first addressed in the GATT as  early as 1956 when the Contracting Parties (CP)
adopted  a joint  resolution  on  Particular  Difficulties Connected with  Trade in  Primary  Commodities.
Characteristically for these early attempts to cope with what would turn out to be a very thorny problem,
the  resolution  called for  an  annual review  of  trends and  developments in  commodity trade  and  the
convening of an inter-governmental  meeting, if it was felt that 'international joint action' would usefully
contribute to the solution of the problem. In 1958, the Haberler report - of an expert panel appointed by
the 1957 GATT Ministerial-concluded,  in quaint and guarded language, that 'there is some substance in
the feeling of disquiet among primary producing countries that the present rules and conventions about
commercial  policies  are  relatively  unfavourable  to  them.'  The  report  went  on  to  recommend:  (a)
stabilisation programs to address commodity price fluctuations through buffers stocks, and (b) reductions
4The GATT  Report of  the Review  Working  Party on Quantitative  Restrictions  (L/332/Rev),  1955,  argued  that  the
safeguard provisions  of Article XII, paras 1 and 2, which allowed for quantitative  restrictions  on inports in
4in  developed  countries'  internal  taxes  on  primary  products  such as  coffee, tea  and  tobacco  which
restrained consumption and import demand (GATT, 1958).
In 1961 the GATT adopted another declaration on the 'Promotion of Trade of Less developed Countries,'
which  inter alia called for  preferences in market access for  developing  countries not covered  by the
preferential tariff systems (such as the Commonwealth preferences) or by preferences in customs unions
or free trade areas which were subsequently established. This was the first mention in the GATT of what
would later on become the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) for developing countries.
Subsequently, in  1964, the GATT adopted a  specific legal framework within which  the  concerns of
developing countries could be addressed: Part IV,  dealing specifically with Trade and Development and
containing three new Articles, XXXVI to XXXVIII. Article XXXVI  states that contracting parties are to
provide 'in  the  largest possible measure more favourable and  acceptable market  access conditions  for
products  of  export  interest  to  developing  countries,  notably  primary  products  and  processed  or
manufactured products.  Paragraph  8 of the Article  states the principle of less-than-full  reciprocityby
specifying that developing country  members  'should not be expected' to make contributions which are
inconsistent with their level of development in the process of trade negotiations 5. Article XXXVII calls
for the 'highest priority'  to be given to the elimination of restrictions which  'differentiate  unreasonably'
between primary  and processed products,  and requires contracting parties to take full account of the
impact  of  trade  policy  instruments  permitted  by  the  agreement  on  developing  country  CP.  Article
XXXVIII calls for joint action of contracting parties through international arrangements with a view to
improving market access for products of export interest to developing countries. The Committee on Trade
and Development was established, with a  mandate  to review the application of Part IV provisions, carry
out  or  arrange  any  consultations  required  in  the  application  of  Part  IV  provisions,  and  consider
extensions and modifications to Part IV suggested by CP with a view to furthering the objectives of trade
and development.
A  pattern  appears  to  have  evolved  during these  early  years:  the CP  of  GATT  accommodated
developing country desires not to liberalise their import regimes  partly on infant industry grounds, partly
for balance  of payments  reasons;  but regarding  questions of  improved access to  developed  country
response  to an imminent  threat of a decline in monetary  reserves,  were not adequate in the case of developing
country  members,  for whom  insufficiency  in reserves  was deemed  to be a more  chronic  problem.
5  The Decision  on Tropical  Products  approved  the objective  of duty free access for Tropical  Products  in developed
country  markets  (GATT,  1964).  Article  XXXVI  stopped  short  of extending  the total non  reciprocity  affirmed  in this
Decision  to other  aspects  of trade between  developed  and developing  country  Members.
5markets as well  as commodity price stabilisation,  the GATT refrained from taking  action or making
legally binding commitments. For example,  none of the provisions of Part IV legally bound developed
countries  to  undertake  specific  actions  in  favour  of  developing  country  CP.  And  the  Trade  and
Development Committee was  then, and still is, primarily a forum to discuss developing country issues
but not to negotiate legal commitments in their favour. During this period, many developing countries
were not CP of the GATT, and those that were, participated minimally in its deliberations.
Partly because  developing countries felt that their trade concerns were not being effectively addressed in
the  GATT,  they  lobbied  for  and  succeeded in the  establishment of  a  separate  organisation to  deal
explicitly with problems of trade and development. This organisation, the United Nations Conference on
Trade and development (UNCTAD) came into being in  1964, and became the main institution through
which  developing  countries tried to  pursue their international trade  agenda. during this  period.  The
establishment  of a  system of preferences for developing country exports of manufactures in developed
country markets and stabilisation of commodity trade were important topics on the Agenda of the new
institution over the decades of the 1960's and 1970's.
In 1968  the developing countries succeeded in establishing a  Generalised System of Preferences (GSP)
under the auspices of UNCTAD. The system was established  on a voluntary  basis by  the developed
countries-meaning  they were not legally bound under the GATT to maintain it; but  a GATT waiver
from MFN obligations was granted in 1971, initially for a period of ten years (GATT, 1972), along with
another waiver allowing developing country CP to grant preferences amongst themselves.
While pursuing the GSP,  developing countries were at the same time  benefiting from significant gains in
market access that were the product of tariff reductions implemented on an MFN basis for all GATT CP,
leading in effect to the creation of two 'tracks' along which market access was extended. The stability and
predictability of market access resulting from the practice of binding tariffs in the GATT was a further
gain: in general, developed countries' tariff bindings throughout the history of the GATT and the WTO
have corresponded to the rates actually applied.
Both the Kennedy Round of negotiations, which ended in 1967, and the Tokyo Round, which ended in
1979,  resulted in cuts on tariffs on  industrial goods on the basis of an agreed formula.  However, the
average reduction  in tariffs  following each round was  less favourable to  developing countries  than
6developed countries: 26 per cent, compared to an average reduction of 36 per cent on  goods of export
interest to developed countries after the Kennedy Round (UNCTAD,1968) and  26 per cent compared to
33 per cent after the Tokyo Round (GATT, 1979). This was because many products of export interest to
them were either exempted from formnula  cuts or subject to lower than formula cuts. On the other hand, a
number of developed countries extended to developing countries non-reciprocal reductions in duties on
tropical products.
The relatively less favourable  outcome of the two Rounds for the developing countries was  in part
attributable to  the  limited  active participation  by  them  in  the  actual  GATT  process  of negotiating
concessions. (Hudec, 1987, Kemper, 1980). The basic formula having being agreed, developed countries
then negotiated exceptions to the cuts specified by the formula amongst themselves. Final concessions
were then extended to all members by virtue of the MFN provisions of the GATT. While  developed
countries  did  consider  developing  countries'  demands relating  to  products  of  export  interest,  these
demands tended to be either met or rejected, without substantial further negotiation.
In the Kennedy and Tokyo Rounds, developing countries placed at least as much emphasis on discussing
the extent to and the manner in which they should undertake the rights and obligations of the multilateral
trading system, as on the negotiation of specific concessions and commitments. The principal result of
these  'Framnework  Discussions'  of the  Tokyo Round was the  Enabling  Clause  of  1979. The Clause
established the principle of differential and more favourable treatment, reciprocity and fuller participation
of developing countries (GATT,  1980). It provided for: (i) the preferential market access of developing
countries  to  developed  country  markets  on  a  non  reciprocal,  non  discriminatory  basis;  (ii)  'more
favourable' treatment for developing countries in other GATT rules dealing with non-tariff barriers (iii)
the introduction of preferential trade regimes between developing countries; (iv) and the special treatment
of least developed countries in the context of specific measures for developing countries.
The establishment of the Enabling Clause thus gave a stronger legal basis for the special and differential
treatment of developing countries within the rules of the multilateral trading system. While the Clause
gave formal embodiment to  the concept of special and  differential treatment, it continued to  do so in
discretionary and permissive, rather than legally binding terms.
6  The formula  for the Kennedy  Round required  a cut of 50 per cent on tariffs on industrial  goods. The so called
'Swiss'  formula for the Tokyo Round reduced  tariffs to a level z, where z=14x/(x+14),  where x is the pre-round
tariff; it thereby  generated  greater  reductions  in higher  tariffs  than lower  ones.
7In terms of concrete measures in favour of developing countries, the Enabling Clause transformed the 10-
year waivers  for the GSP and for trade preferences among developing countries into permanent waivers.
In this  regard,  the  Clause did not create any new  legally binding obligations  for  developed  country
Members: it made possible the introduction of  preferential and non reciprocal market access schemes,
with the extent  of preferences and  the level of reciprocity left to the  discretion  of each country that
extended them.  In bringing together the key elements of preferential market access, non reciprocity and
flexibility in the implementation of rules and commitments, the Enabling Clause was a summation, rather
than an extension, of the efforts made since 1954 to address the concerns of developing countries within
the multilateral trading system.
The permissiveness of  S&D was also reflected in the  non-participation of developing  countries  in a
number of  agreements negotiated during  the Tokyo Round on such matters as Export  Subsidies and
Countervailing, Technical Barriers to Trade, and  Government Procurement. Although these agreements
contained specific S&D measures for developing countries, most of them  chose not to join arguing that
they were invited to join them late in the negotiation process which had been conducted without their full
participation (WTO, 1999) -a  complaint that will be frequently repeated in later years.
As a counterweight to the provisions for special and differential  treatment  of the Enabling Clause and for
relaxation of Article XVIII disciplinesd,  the contracting parties agreed to the principle of 'graduation'.  The
idea of graduation was expressed in the expectation that the capacity of developing countries to undertake
negotiated conditions and to make contributions, within  the framework of rights and obligations  of the
multilateral trading system,  would increase with the improvement over time of their economic status and
trade  situation.  This  provided the  formal basis  for  developed countries  to  phase  out  non-reciprocal
preferential market access measures to CP which, over time, were deemed to have attained  a sufficient
level of progress (GATT,  1980, p.205). Because preferences, as permitted under the Enabling  Clause,
were permissive and non-binding, and because of the 'fuller participation' clause, developing countries
could have no legal recourse in the GATT against such action.
Finally, following a series of negotiations in UNCTAD, the Common Fund for Commodities (CFC)was
established  in  1980 and  went into effect  in  1989.  The Fund has two  objectives pursued  by  its two
Accounts. The First Account is designed to finance international buffer  stocks and  internationally co-
7The  requirement  for advance  warning  was removed  ( GATT, 1980,  p 209).
8ordinated  national  stocks.  The  Second  Account  is  to be  used  to  finance  measures  for  commodity
development, as well as promote co-ordination and consultation on commodity issues.
C. Rethinking  Trade and Development in the 1980's.
It could be argued that by the beginning of the 1980's  developing countries had achieved their objectives
in establishing international trade rules that were responsive to their perceived needs for development: (a)
they had ample flexibility under the existing GATT rules in providing protection on  infant industry or
balance of payments grounds; (b) they did not have to  liberalise their trade on a reciprocal basis in the
context  of multilateral  trade  negotiations;  (c)  they  could  support  their  exports  through  subsidies-
although subject to the risk of countervailing duties; (d) they had preferential access to developed country
markets under the GSP; and (e) they had a new Fund to support commodity stabilisation schemes.
Yet, all was not well in the international  rules governing developing country trade. There were two sets
of problems:  first, access conditions  for  developing countries in developed  country markets  were  far
worse  than  one  might  suspect  given  the  existence  of  GSP  and  extensive  reductions  in  tariffs  on
manufactures negotiated in previous GATT Rounds; second, just as the developing countries appeared to
have attained success in establishing a set of trade rules that would be beneficial to their development, the
intellectual underpinnings for these rules started to be extensively  questioned.
T'here  were many serious problems regarding market access. First, while considerable reductions in tariffs
on manufacturing imports to developed countries had been made, non tariff barriers continued to exist,
and if anything, to increase especially on products of interest to developing countries.This was especially
true regarding textiles and clothing (under the so called Multifiber Arrangement-MFA)  but also other so
called  'voluntary'  export restraints  imposed by  developed countries on  emerging developing  country
suppliers in such products as shoes, iron and steel, and non ferrous metals. Second, while tariffs had been
reduced, tariff escalation was substantial, restraining  developing country entry into the processed goods
markets-and  to  that  extent  inhibiting  their  industrialisation  efforts.  Third,  the  agricultural  sector
remained essentially outside the GATT, permitting developed country exporters to constrain imports and
subsidise exports at will including on a number of products of export interest to developing countries.
The GSP turned out less than  it was touted to be at its inception. At  best, it was important  for  some
products, for some countries and for some of the time. But it was not a driving force in strengthening the
integration of developing countries in the world trading system.  Being a voluntary scheme, it meant that
9developing country suppliers had less certainty regarding market conditions than  under the contractual
arrangements involving bound tariffs in the GATT. At the same time the benefits of preferences seemed
to be concentrated on the more advanced developing countries which needed them the least. According to
one study (Karsteny and Laird,  1987) four beneficiaries, Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea and Taiwan derived
more than 50% of all GSP benefits. But, perhaps most important, a number of products, such as textiles,
of  great  export  interest  to  developing  countries  were  either  excluded  from  preferential  treatment
completely or severely limited. In addition, the margin of preference was eroded as a consequence of the
MFN reductions in tariffs which occurred in the Tokyo Round8
Recourse by developed countries to 'graduating' higher income or more competitive developing counties
from  GSP  (along  with  recourse  on  occasion to  political  or  non-trade  related  graduation  criteria),
increased the  relative importance of reciprocal liberalisation with 'bound'  concessions. Over time, other
preferential  systems  also emerged which  applied to different  developing country  groupings  in various
developed country markets, such as the so called 'Lome'  preferences for ACP countries in the markets for
the  EU which  offered  deeper and  more  'secure'  preferences than  the GSP.  Indeed, it appeared  that
developed countries saw measures such as the GSP as a substitute for thoroughgoing action to liberalise
trade ( Leutweiller,  1985).
At the same time serious rethinking of the trade  policies appropriate for development was taking place in
many developing countries. From the early  seventies and throughout the decade many had  started to
seriously  question the effectiveness of  infant industry protection, supported through trade  controls and
foreign  exchange restrictions  as a vehicle for industrialisation and long term sustainable  development.
Various  potential  perils  in persisting  with  import substitution  strategies  had  been  identified.  Trade
barriers designed to protect infant industries created disincentives to export, since high rates of effective
protection distorted relative  prices in favour of import competing production. As a result, many infant
industries  remained  inefficient  and  failed  to  achieve  export competitiveness. 9  In  cases  where  the
provision of selective incentives was attempted, the overall trade regime often  proved too complex to
administer. The use of quantitative restrictions and exchange controls increased the scope for rent-seeking
activities (Krueger, 1974). The inefficiency and waste implicit in  some  import-substitution policies led to
s The trade weighted  preferential  margin  on imports  (agricultural  and industrial) into the EEC,  the US and Japan fell
by 27.3 per cent following  the completion  of the Tokyo  Round  (UNCTAD,  1980).
9 There were several series of  intensive studies of developing country trade regimes during this period which reached these conclusions. The two
most important were a five volume effort sponsored by the OECD,whose  findings  are summarised in Little, Scitovsky and Scott, 1970; and a
twelve volume study  under the auspices of the National Bureau of Economic Research  whose findings are summarised irBhagwati, 1978 and
Krueger,  1978.
10increased  vulnerability  to external  shocks,  even in countries  which had achieved  fast rates of growth in
real income in the earlier stages of import substitution.  At the same time, import substitution based
industrialisation  policies  typically discriminated against the agricultural  sector, contributing  to  an
increased incidence  of rural poverty (Krueger  et.al. 1988). Moreover, the use of  fiscal and monetary
instruments  is far superior to trade and exchange  control  measures  to address external  imbalances  as the
former do not entail the resource  misallocation  costs typically associated  with latter. As a consequence
there seemed  to be  little  justification for the use of trade restrictions  in addressing  balance-of-payments
difficulties  (Bhagwati,  1978).
The experience  gained in the 1960's and 1970's also seemed to  suggest  that countries  that had pursued
more 'open' trade policies i.e.  ones which broadly balanced incentives favouring import competing
production  with incentives  in favour of manufacturing  exports,  were the ones  that had experienced  strong
growth in both exports and per capita income. On the other hand, countries which had persisted with
import substitution behind high trade barriers had broadly experienced  slow growth or declines in per
capita  income
While the direction of causality between  trade and income growth is controversial,  developing  country
practice  starting  with the 1980's leaves no doubt  that a large  number  opted for more open trade regimes
and  many countries undertook autonomous trade  liberalisation involving fewer trade  restrictions
motivated  by the belief  that such regimes were more conducive  to the attainment  of their development
objectives.  Many developing  countries  introduced  stabilisation  and adjustment  programmes,  during this
period (supported by  the World Bank and/ or the International Monetary Fund) which frequently
involved the conversion of quantitative restrictions into tariffs, tariff reduction, the phasing out of
selective  export  subsidies,  and the liberalisation  of foreign  exchange  markets.  '°
All this was done outside the GATT  and involved  no changes  in the formal commitments  of developing
countries  in that context.  Indeed, the argument  was made that the emphasis  within GATT  on provisions
for  Special and Differential  treatment  - as embodied,  inter alia, in the Enabling Clause - created scope
within the multilateral trading system  for the implementation,  and in some cases entrenchment,  of
development  strategies  with deleterious  consequences.  In addition it has been argued  that,  by allowing  a
great deal of flexibility in the implementation  of GATT rules and commitments,  the provisions  for S&D
"" 'In the broad swing of the pendulum, developing  countries  have been shifting from severe and destructive  protection  to free trade fever'
(Dombush,  1992); 'The 1980's have seen the beginnings  of a change  of heart among developing  country policy makers  with regard  to trade
policy.  The import  substitution  consensus  of the previous  decades,  with it's preferencefor  high levels  of tariff  and non-tariff  barriers,  has all but
evaporated'  ( Rodrik,1992).
11treatment may have introduced a bias  in favour of protection and  against exports in the formulation  of
commercial policy."
At the  same time  as developing  countries were starting  to take  steps to  liberalise trade  policy  in the
1980's,  there  was an emerging recognition of the value  of their participating  actively  in multilateral
negotiations with a view to securing market access in areas of export interest through the agreement of
reciprocal commitments  and concessions. This was in turn connected to the recognition that, partly as a
consequence of the emphasis on non-reciprocity, the MFN tariff concessions agreed in the Kennedy and
Tokyo Rounds were on the whole less favourable for products of export interest to developing countries
than were concessions relating to products of interest to developed countries.
Finally,  attitudes regarding the usefulness of buffer stocks and commodity agreements as instruments for
commodity  market  stabilisation  started to  be questioned.  Dependence on  a few  primary  commodity
exports continued to be great for many developing countries as was continued deterioration of the terms
of trade of primary commodity exporters (Sapsford and Balasubramanyam 1999). But, efforts to use such
agreements to reverse or slow down deterioration in terms of trade through supply management failed. By
the early  1990s new,  market based approaches to guard against price fluctuations started to be explored
and by  1996, the  economic provisions  in all  major commodity agreements had either  lapsed or failed
(ITF,  1999). While the Common Fund has used technical assistance to increase productivity and supply
response of primary producing developing countries, no funds have ever been used from its First Account
to support buffer stock management of commodity agreements.
Both as a  consequence of the waning interest in GSP and commodity stabilisation  and the emerging
consensus  on  more  liberal  trade  policies  as  being  more  conducive  to  development  and  the  rising
importance of reciprocal liberalisation as a means of attaining greater market access, the  importance of
GATT as an institution within which developing countries wanted to pursue trade  objectives started to
rise.  This was  manifested  by  the  decision  of  a number  of developing  countries,  especially  in  Latin
America (e.g. Mexico) to join the GATT. It was in this setting of evolving attitudes towards trade policy
and  participation  of  developing  countries  in  the  GATT  that  the  Uruguay  Round  was  launched,
symbolically  enough, in a developing country in  1986. The Round which was to conclude eight  years
later brought about a fundamental  restructuring of the rules guiding the  international trading system as
well as significant change in the role developing countries played within the system.
See Michalopoulos,  1985.
12III. The Uruguay Round and the Development Dimension of the WTO.
The Uruguay  Round resulted in the multilateral  trading system being greatly strengthened  and deepened
in ways which carry the potential  for greater integration  of the developing  countries.  This  was achieved
through the extension of trade rules to cover services, trade related intellectual property rights and
investment measures, as  well  as through the  establishment of  a  strengthened dispute settlement
mechanism.  One of the issues that emerged in the late  1990s however, was precisely whether this
potential  was being realised.
There  were two aspects  of the UR agreements  of great  potential  importance  to developing  countries.  First,
the strengthening  of dispute settlement  mechanism through the introduction  of greater certainty in the
adoption of the quasi-judicial  decisions of dispute settlement panels was of great potential benefit to
developing  countries:  it offers  judicial system  protection  against the larger and more powerful  developed
countries and a better chance of  prevailing  in a bilateral trade dispute  with them than they would have
outside  the WTO rules. Second,  several  UR agreements  carried  the potential  for significant  market access
improvements  in areas of interest  to developing  countries.  Specifically,  market access  negotiations  in the
Uruguay Round covered areas not previously subject to GATT disciplines, such as  agriculture,  and
textiles and clothing which are of particular  interest to developing  Members. Moreover,  the Agreement
on Safeguards  benefited  developing  Members'  market access  though the elimination  of Voluntary  Export
Restraints,  which had been significant  barriers  in  areas such a footwear  and leather products. And, of
course, the UR negotiations  on tariffs resulted in further  reductions  in tariffs on industrial  imports with
the  average  trade weighted  tariff rate on such  imports  from developing  Members  declining by 34 per
cent.
At the end of the UR a  number of studies were undertaken which attempted to  estimate through
quantitative  model simulations some the prospective  potential net benefits from the UR agreements  to
developing  countries.  Invariably,  these studies suggested  large potential  gains to developing  countries  in
the aggregate,  although  the distribution  of benefits  was expected  to favour  countries  in Latin America and
East Asia, while countries  in Africa seemed  to benefit little if at all. In part this appeared  to result from
the fact that the African  countries  liberalised  their trade less, while they could  be expected  to lose more
as a consequence  of the potential increases in prices of food imports  ensuing from reduced agricultural
export subsidies in developed  countries. Moreover,  the dynamic benefits that could be visualised as a
consequence  of  increases  in trade and incomes  world-wide  tended to dwarf  the estimated  static effects of
trade liberalisation  (Harrison  et.al. 1996).
13At the same time, developing countries  by participating  in the new UR Agreements  in Services,  Trade
Related  Intellectual  Property  Rights (TRIPS)  and Trade  Related  Investment  Measures  (TRIMS),  accepted
rules and disciplines on policies in areas in which they had previously  enjoyed complete latitude. The
same was true for the new agreements on Subsidies, Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT),  Customs
Valuation, Sanitary and Phytosanitary  Meansures  (SPS) all of which converted previous plurilateral
agreements, in  which  few  developing countries participated,  into  general  developing country
commitments to abide with  multilaterally agreed rules, albeit within a framework of certain S&D
provisions  ( see below). Tighter  disciplines  were also introduced  on actions  taken under Article  XVIII (B)
which ran counter  to trade liberalisation.  The  Understanding  encourages  the use of price-based  measures,
extends documentation  and notification  requirements,  and provides procedures  for the phasing out of
restrictions.  These modifications  were at least partly informed  by the developments  in economicpolicy
described  earlier, most notably regarding  the greater  effectiveness  in fiscal and monetary instruments  in
meeting  balance-of-payments  shocks.
The UR also saw an evolution of developing country attitudes regarding S&D provisions. The UR
agreements  continued  to be guided  by the general  S&D  principles  agreed  in previous  negotiating  Rounds,
which were actually extended in a number  of ways.  But  without  formally giving up on the principle  of
non-reciprocity,  developing countries eschewed past practices and participated more actively in the
exchange of reciprocal liberalisation  in goods and services.  In particular, as part of the agreement on
agriculture  they agreed to bind all their tariffs in the sector.  And  they also increased  their share of bound
industrial tariffs from 14% to 59%. The distribution of these bindings by region was quite different:
developing countries in Latin America essentially  bound all their tariffs, while few countries in Asia
bound their whole schedule and few in Africa bound any at all (Michalopoulos  1999b).  Also, the vast
majority of these bindings were at levels much higher than the applied levels, leaving developing
countries  considerable  flexibility  in increasing  tariffs should  they decide to do so.
In  other respects, special and  differential provisions regarding mnarket  access through GSP were
maintained.  Flexibility,  was also maintained  e.g. by permitting  developing  countries  certain practices in
support  of agriculture  which were not allowed  to other  countries,  and similarly  regarding  export subsidies.
Moreover,  the UR agreements  introduced  new elements  of S&D  by providing  for transitional  time frames
and technical assistance in the implementation  of the various agreements  introduced  in the WTO. The
basic reason  underlying  the extension  of S&D  treatment  through  these  two new elements  was simply  that
developing  countries  did not have the institutional  capacity  to implement  the commitments  demanded  of
14them in some of the new areas covered by the WTO. They  would not have signed the UR agreements had
they not been promised both additional time and technical assistance to build the necessary capacity.2
IV. The Conceptual Justification for Special and Differential Treatment
The legal texts  of the agreements  embodied in the  WTO contain  a very  large  number  of provisions
regarding differential and more favourable treatment of developing and least developed countries . And
there are additional references to the Least Developed Countries, which for example, benefit from longer
transition periods in the implementation of certain agreements such as TRIPS. Thus, while a lot has been
made of the increasing participation of developing countries in the UR agreements on the same basis as
other members, the UR agreements are replete with S&D provisions. (GATT, 1995).  Some provisions
are in the nature of exhortations whose implementation is difficult to evaluate; others, although also of a
general nature, underpin programs such as the GSP; still others are very specific and relate to a particular
aspect of developed or developing country policy.
There are several conceptual premises underlying the provision of S&D as it has emerged over time and
as reflected in the WTO agreements.  The fundamental one is that developing countries are intrinsically
disadvantaged  in  their  participation  in  international  trade  and  therefore,  any  multilateral  agreement
involving them and developed countries must take into account of this intrinsic weakness in specifying
their rights and responsibilities.  A related premise, has been that the trade policies that would maximise
sustainable  development  in developing countries are different from those  in developed economies  and
hence that policy disciplines applying to the latter should not apply to the former. The final premise is that
it is in the interest of developed countries to  assist developing countries  in their fuller  integration and
participation in the international trading system.
Based on  these premises the provisions introduced  into the WTO agreements to  provide fall into two
broad  categories:  (a) positive  actions by  developed country members or  international  institutions;  (b)
exceptions  to  the  overall  rules  contained  in  the  agreements that  apply  to  developing  countries  and,
sometimes, additional exceptions for the least developed countries ( Michalopoulos, 1998).
12 Participants  in the final negotiations  for establishing  the WTO  have indicated  that there was a tacit understanding
that transition  periods in the implementation  of some of these agreements  were linked  to transition  periods in the
implementation  of the agreement  on Textiles  and Clothing.
15A. Positive Steps to be Taken by Developed Countries
There  are three  kinds  of actions that  developed countries have agreed to  take to  support  developing
countries participation in  intemational trade: (a) provide preferential access to their markets; (b) provide
technical and other assistance to permit them to meet their WTO obligations and otherwise enhance the
benefits  developing countries derive from intemational trade;  (c) implement the  overall agreements  in
ways which are beneficial or least damaging to the interests of developing and least developed countries.
1. Preferential Market Access
As noted earlier, in recognition of the importance for developing countries to diversify their exports into
manufacturing and  the difficulties  that they  may  face  in breaking  into intemational  markets  for  such
products, developed countries have provided tariff preferences to exports of manufactures from developing
countries under the GSP and, within that context, for special treatment of the LDCs. As already discussed,
the key  issue  regarding these  programs is whether in practice they  make  a  significant contribution  in
enhancing market access prospects for developing countries.
2. Technical and other Assistance
The WTO agreements contain numerous references to the desirability of developed country members and
international institutions to provide technical assistance to developing and least developed countries. The
main objective of such assistance is the strengthening of the institutional capacity of developing and least
developed countries in way which would enable them to meet the obligations they have assumed under the
agreements.  The main  areas  in  which  technical  assistance is envisaged  include  TBT,  SPS, Customs
Valuation, Pre-shipment Inspection, Dispute Settlement, TPR and TRIPS.' 3 In most  cases, the relevant
articles call for the assistance to be provided upon request by the developing country or Least Developed
countries and on terms and conditions appropriate to the countries involved.
The  conceptual  underpinning  of  these  provisions  relates  to  the  emerging  analytical  consensus  that
institutional constraints are of major significance in inhibiting the effective integration of poorer and least
developed countries  in the multilateral trading  system. While  it may  be  relatively easy to  promulgate
policies to  liberalise trade,  it  is far  more  difficult to  develop  the  capacity  to  take  advantage  of  the
16opportunities international trade  provides. Weaknesses in the  human  and  physical  infrastructure and
institutions related to international trade have been identifying as key impediments in developing countries
capacity to benefit from international trade and technical assistance support by developed countries and
international institutions (  as well  as  longer transition periods, see  below) have been recommended as
means to address these problems.  1
4 But a number of concerns have been raised regarding the high costs and
affordability of implementing the UR agreements  ( Finger and Schuler, 1999) or whether technical assistance
alone can deal with the heavy investment in both physical and human costs needed to build capacity in areas
where developing countries have assumed WTO commitments.
Pursuant to the mandate provided by these articles and  other decisions, such as the Decision on Measures in
Favour of Least Developed Countries, a variety of technical assistance activities and programs are being
provided by international organisations, in particular the WTO, UNCTAD and ITC and the World Bank.
The main question which arises in this area of implementation of special and differential provisions, is the
overall adequacy and effectiveness of the efforts of the WTO itself  as well  of WTO members and the
international community in general, in providing technical and other assistance  relative to the needs of
developing countries and to the least developed.
3. Implementation of WTO Provisions in a Manner Favourable  to Developing Country Members
The WTO agreements contain many references in the preambles as well as in the substantive  provisions of
the various texts committing members to implement the agreements in ways which take into account the
interests of developing and least developed countries. These references are of two kinds: (a) some are of a
general nature and are expressed in broad 'best efforts' terminology; (b) in a  few cases there  are more
explicit provisions as to how developing countries are supposed to be treated more favourably or in ways
which are least damaging to their interests.
Examples of  general preambular statements include 'the need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries and especially the least developed.. secure a share in the growth in international trade
commensurate with the needs of their economic development', (Preamble of the Agreement for establishing
13 See  inter alia SPS Article 9.1; TBT Article 11, 12.7; Implementation of  GATT Article VII-- Article
20.3; Pre Shipment Inspection, Article 1.2; TRIPS Article 67; DSB Article 27.2; TPRM Section.
'4See UNCTAD/WTO, 1996, for a discussion of the specific structural weaknesses in developing country
trade which would justify differential treatment and policies.
17the WTO);  that 'in implementing their commitments on market access  (in agriculture), developed country
members would take fully into account the particular needs and conditions of developing country members
by providing for a greater improvement of opportunities and terms of access for agricultural products of
particular interest to these members', ( Preamble of Agreement in Agriculture); that 'Members shall give
particular attention to the provisions of this agreement (TBT) concerning developing country Members'
rights and obligations ... ' ( Article 12.2); and the recognition
'that special regard must be given by developed country Members to the special situation of developing
country Members when considering the application of antidumping measures', (Article 15).
In considering the implementation of these provisions in the WTO, a strong case can be made that they are
not legally enforceable ( Kessie, 2000). Nonetheless, there are serious questions as to whether developed
countries have lived up to spirit of these commitments. For example there has been no concerted effort to
provide  preferential treatment  to  least developed countries and  small  exporters  in the  context  of the
agreement on textiles under articles 2.18 and 6.6. Similarly, there is no evidence that the provision regarding
the use of constructive remedies before applying anti-dumping duties on imports from developing countries
(article 15) has been employed. On the contrary, there is evidence that the proportion of total antidumping
investigations and  the imposition  of 'definitive'  antidumping measures against developing countries is
much higher than the  share of these countries in world exports (Michalopoulos, 1999b). And  very few
developed countries appear to have notified the WTO  regarding the establishment of contact points to
facilitate access of developing country service suppliers (article IV:2).
B. Differential Commitments and Obligations by Developing Countries
There  are  two  fundamental  ways  in  which  developing and  least  developed countries  have  accepted
differential obligations under the WTO agreements: (a) they enjoy freedom to undertake policies which
limit access to their markets or provide support to domestic producers or exporters in ways which are not
allowed to other members--all of which can be viewed as exemptions from WTO disciplines to take into
account particular developing country circumstances;  (b) they are provided with more time  in meeting
obligations or commitments under the agreements. In some cases, more favourable treatment  involves a
combination of (a) and (b).
181.  Exemptions  from Disciplines
The most general  and fundamental  way in which  developing  countries  continue  to be exempted  from WTO
disciplines  regarding  market access  policies is the recognition  of the principle  of non-reciprocity  in trade
negotiations  with developed  countries  to reduce  or remove  tariffs  and other  barriers  to trade.  This principle
is recognised in GATT (1994) Article XXXVI and in the 'Enabling Clause'. Consistent  with these
provisions,  many  developing  countries  have  not bound  tariffs  on their industrial  products  to the same  extent
as developed  countries  or have agreed  to bind at substantially  higher  than applied  levels.  Similar  provisions
for non-reciprocity  are included in GATS, Article XIX2 which states that 'There shall be appropriate
flexibility  for individual  developing  countries  Members  for opening  fewer sectors, liberalising  fewer types
of transactions,  progressively  extending  market  access  in line  with their development  situation...'
2. Protection  to Domestic  Industry
A second  way in which developing  countries  have greater flexibility  in providing  protection  to domestic
industry is through  the provisions  of GATT  Article  XVIII,  which  give  developing  countries  the freedom  to:
(a) be able to grant  the tariff protection  required  for the establishment  of a particular  industry  and (b) apply
quantitative  restrictions  for balance  of payments  purposes.  Since  the establishment  of WTO  there have  been
very few instances  in which  these  provisions  have  been  actually  invoked.
The Agreement  on Agriculture  also contains  a variety  of measures  which  exempt  developing  countries  and,
to even a greater extent, least developed  countries  from disciplines  and obligations  that apply generally,
and/or  provides  for longer  timetables  or more  modest  reductions  in government  support  and subsidies  than
apply  to other  members.  For example,  investment  subsidies  or input  subsidies  to low income  producers  are
exempted  from the calculation  of aggregate  measures  of support  (AMS);  reductions  in export  subsidies  are
either targeted  to be lower or to occur over a longer  period of time; and there are specific provisions
regarding  the operation  of government  stockholding  programs  aimed at enhancing  food security  as well as
less demanding  minimum access provisions regarding primary agricultural products that are  the
predominant  staple in the traditional  diet of a developing  country.  A number  of developing  countries  have
notified  the WTO that they are implementing  programs  which take into account the specific  exemptions
contained  in these  provisions.
19Similar exemptions from disciplines are to be found in the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
measures: the agreement permits countries with per capita income of less than $1000 and least developed
countries to maintain certain  kinds of export subsidies which are otherwise prohibited; while for  other
developing countries the period over which subsidies can be  provided is longer. Again  a  number  of
developing countries have invoked these provisions in notifying the WTO that they maintain export subsidy
programs.
Finally, the agreements contain a number of other provisions which permit developing countries greater
flexibility  in  meeting  requirements:  for  example,  the  Enabling  Clause  calls  for  greater  flexibility  in
determining adherence to the GATT provisions regarding the formation of free trade areas and customs
unions  among  developing  countries;  the  Agreement  on  TRIMS  permits  a  temporary  deviation  for
developing  countries  applying  balance  of  payments  measures;  and  the  dispute  settlement  agreement
provides for  special procedures for  least developed countries. Flexibility  is  also  given  to  developing
country Members to attach conditions to  the establishment of  foreign  suppliers,' 5 introducing  a new
dimension to trade - and to  special and differential treatment - within the  context of the  multilateral
system.
Flexibility has thus emerged as the mostwidespread  instrument of special and differential treatment.  It
could be argued that flexibility, as applied in the  WTO, is not the negation of reciprocity. Commitments
were  agreed  on  a  reciprocal  basis,  and  flexibility  applies  to  the  differential  application  of  such
commitments.  However,  the  Uruguay  Round  Agreements,  by  placing  flexibility  in  the  context  of
reciprocity, mark a significant shift  in the handling of development issues within the multilateral trading
system, away from the concept  of non-reciprocity.
A fundamental question of implementation regarding the flexibility afforded to  developing countries in
pursuing different policies is whether the latitude permitted, including e.g. regarding bindings, results  in
policies which are more suitable to development. A more narrow issue  is that  developing countries' rights
to  differential  treatment  in  certain  instances, e.g.  in subsidies  and  countervailing  as well  as  in  the
Agreement on Agriculture, are conditioned on their notification of the existence of certain subsidies as of a
particular time. While a number of developing countries have indeed availed themselves of these provisions
15 For instance  The Annex on Telecommunications  states provisions  for placing  reasonable  conditions  of access to
public telecommunications  transport networks and services consonant with the need to  strengthen domestic
20and provided such notifications, there is a general impression that many countries have not fully notified
measures that they have been implementing and therefore may at some point in the future face challenges to
these policies for failure to notify them.
3. Time Extensions
The final way in which special and differential treatment is provided in the WTO is through the provision
of extension in the time frame over which certain obligations under the agreements are to be implemented
by developing and least developed countries. Flexibility in transition times  isprovided  in practically all
the WTO Agreements, with the exception of the Agreement on Anti-Dumping  Procedures and on Pre-
shipment Inspection. Time extensions are provided for a variety of obligations assumed, especially under
the TBT, SPS and TRIPS agreements. But there are also provisions in Subsidies and Countervailing  as
well  as  in the Agreement  on Agriculture  which permit  developing  countries to  continue to  subsidise
exports for a period of time in a variety of ways  prohibited for other members. In the majority of cases,
flexibility takes the form of a slower rate of implementation of commitments  agreed. For instance, the
agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing measures allows for a transition period of 8 years, while the
agreement  on  Trade-Related  Intellectual  Property  allows  for  a  transition  period  of  5  years.  The
Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, allows developing country Members the flexibility to
implement TRIMS  temporarily in conjunction with Article XVIII: B and C. In the case of the Agreement
on Textiles and Clothing, flexibility was to take the form of an accelerated phasing out of MFA quotas for
developing countries, where the restrictions  imposed by the developed Member accounted for less than
1.2 per cent of all restrictions imposed on the developing Member.
Provisions  for  flexibility  in transition times  allowed the conclusion  of a  number  of agreement  on  a
multilateral  basis, such as Customs Valuation, Import Licensing, Subsidies and  Safeguards, which  had
been  dealt with  only  on  a  plurilateral  basis  prior  to the  Uruguay  Round.  Transition  time  related
flexibility,  like other  types  of  flexibility discussed  in the  previous  section,  is thus  a  mechanism  for
providing  special  and  differential  treatment  within  the  context  of  reciprocal  and  multilateral
commitments.  16  And a strong case can be made that these provisions regarding special and differential
telecommunications  infrastructure and  increase the  participation (  of  the  developing country member) in
international  trade.
16 However,  developing  countries seeking to accede to the WTO do not benefit automatically  from transitional
period  provisions  (Drabek  and Laird, 1998)
21treatment  to developing  countries-unlike the provisions  calling  for developed  country  actions,  are legally
enforceable  (Kessie,  2000).
The fundamental  justification  for the extension  of additional  time to implement  agreed  measures  relates to
weaknesses  in the institutional  capacity  of developing  and least developed  countries.  It is assumed,  that
given additional  time (as well as technical  assistance,  which is often also expected  to be provided  in these
areas),  developing  and least  developed  countries  will strengthen  their institutions  in waysthat would  enable
them to  implement  the agreements.  In the case  of subsidies,  the presumption  is that additional  time would
permit countries  to develop the institutions  and policies to implement  alternative  means of support (for
agriculture  or exports  in general)  which  are acceptable  under  the agreement.
The main issues  that arise in the implementation  of this  aspect of special  and differential  treatment  have to
do with the realism  of the  time extensions  called  for in various  aspects  of the agreements  in reference  to the
actual time and cost it takes to build the institutional  capacity needed for full implementation  of the
obligations  undertaken  in the agreements.  In some cases  the time limits for the extensions  have already
passed and there is little evidence  that countries  have made sufficient  progress  in institution  building  to
permit  them to implement  their obligations  fully. On the contrary,  evidence gathered from the needs
assessments  undertaken in the context of implementing  the Integrated  Framework  for Trade Related
Technical  Assistance  for the Least Developed  Countries  suggests  that very many institutional  weaknesses
remain.  The problem may  be  caused in part by the absence  to date of well co-ordinated technical
assistance  and other assistance  programs.  But, it is also possible  that the transition  periods providedreflect
excessive  optimism about how quickly institutional  capacity in these areas can be built. Whatever  the
reason,  one of the more  urgent  issues  that should  be the subject  of a systematic review  of implementation  of
special  and differential  treatment  of the developing  countries  is the time limits set for full implementation  of
certain  provisions  of the agreements  relative  to the costs and time needed  for building  up the institutional
capacity  of countries  to do so.
C. Special  Measures  Concerning  LDCs
The Enabling Clause of 1979 provided  the basis for  special treatment of  least developed countries
(LDCs)  'in the context of any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries'. The
Uruguay  Round  Agreements  contain 17 provisions  applicable  specifically  to LDC Members,  in addition
to those that are applicable to all developing  Members.  These include provisions  for a more extended
22transitional period than applicable to developing  countries, in the TRIPS, TRIMS, and Sanitary and
Phyto-sanitary  Measures  agreements.  The agreements  on Agriculture  and on Subsidies  provide for the
exemption for LDCs from all reduction commitments,  with the Subsidies Agreement allowing for an
extended phasing out  of subsidies once export competitiveness  is  established; and the Annex on
Telecommunications  to the GATS  contains  a provision  seeking  to encourage  private suppliers  in enabling
the transfer of technology  and training  to LDC with a view to developing  the Telecommunications  sector.
A number  of initiatives  have also been adopted  with regard  to LDC Members since  the establishment  of
the WTO. Thus, the 'Decision  on Measures  in Favour  of Least Developed  Countries'  (1994)  allows LDC
Members to  limit commitments and concessions  to the extent compatible with  their individual
development,  financial  and trade needs, and which were consistent  with administrative  and institutional
capabilities.
The High Level Meeting  on LDCs held in October 1997  formalised  the  twin track approach  regarding
special and differential  treatment  of these  countries  in the WTO with one track emphasising  their limited
commitments  to liberalisation  and the other increased  commitments  by developed countries regarding
market access  and technical assistance.  In that context,  a number  of WTO members  announced  measures
for  improved and preferential  market access for LDCs. Regarding  technical assistance,  an 'Integrated
Framework  for Trade Related  Technical  Assistance  to Support  Least Developed  Countries  in their Trade
Related Activities'  was developed  involving  the IMF, ITC, UNCTAD,  UNDP,  the World Bank and the
WTO. This Integrated  Framework  seeks to address shortcomings  relating  to technical and institutional
capacity, particularly in the areas of trade policy, human resources, export supply capability, and
regulatory  regimes.
The key issues  that need to be addressed  in the context of the special  provisions  for the LDCs are much
the same as with developing  countries  as a whole:  are the commitments  for preferential  market access  and
treatment offered by developed  countries  meaningful relative to the constraints  these countries face in
integrating in the world trading system? Is the international  technical assistance in support of these
countries adequate and effective? And does the flexibility offered to these countries in meeting their
WTO commitments  contribute  to their long term trade and development  objectives?
23V. Assessment
This review  of the provisions  in the  GATT and WTO shows that,  in the last fifty  years,  developing
countries succeeded in establishing the principle that the trade rules applying to them and tothe  LDCs
will be in many ways different from those which apply to other WTO members. While  increasing their
commitments  regarding various aspects  of their participation  in the international  trading system,  they
ensured that this participation is guided by the principle of special and differential treatment, which itself
was  amplified  in  a  number  of ways,  especially  regarding  the  provision  of  technical  assistance  and
additional  transitional  periods  for  the  implementation  of their  WTO  commitments.  These  additional
aspects of S&D treatment reflect the increasing recognition that the integration of developing  countries
into the  international trading  system  is constrained by  their own  institutional  weaknesses which  will
require additional time and technical assistance to overcome. In light of the even greater weaknesses in
the  capacities  of  LDCs,  they  have  been  given  additional  time  and  greater  flexibility  in  the
implementation of their commitments.
While the principle of special and differential treatment has been imbedded in many of the agreements
that cover the rules of conduct of trade relations under the WTO, the practice of S&D continues to suffer
from  similar  shortcomings to those  in evidence at  the beginning  of the Uruguay  Round. Three  main
problem areas have emerged: (a) the commitments of developed countries regarding preferential market
access and other treatment are in practice much less importantthan  they appear to be on paper; (b) there
is  increasing questioning  of one  of the fundamental  premises of S&D, namely  that  less liberal  trade
policies are  optimal  for developing countries; and (c) the commitments aimed at addressing developing
countries  institutional  constraints  have  been  made  without  serious  planning  of  how  they  will  be
implemented.
Market Access and other 'More Favourable'  Treatment by Developed Countries. Regarding preferential
market access, the preferences provided under the GSP have been further eroded by two developments.
First, preference margins have been diminished as a consequence of the MFN reductions of tariffs under
the UR.  Second, additional  regional arrangements providing deeper and more  secure preferences  have
been put in place involving in some cases arrangements between developed and developing economies,
such as NAFTA and the Mediterranean agreements with the EU and others among developing countries
themselves ( MERCOSUR) which make the preferences provided under the GSP  less important. Indeed,
in the  EU,  which  has  put  in place  the  largest number of  regional  preferential  arrangements,  to  be
extended  GSP preferences is tantamount to being in the lowest  wrung in the EU  preference pyramid
24which includes practically all countries,  except those to which MFN tariffs are extended such as the US,
Japan,  Australia and a few other developed countries." 7
The other developed country commitments in the WTO agreements  suffer from two shortcomings: either
they are two broad and general in nature-such  as those included in the many preambular statements-to
be of any practical significance; or they are of the best efforts variety, such as for example those regarding
the implementation of the anti-dumping agreement or in connection with the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing (ACT), which again means that they are not legally enforceable and developed countries can not
be held strictly accountable for not implementing them. Indeed, as discussed earlier developed countries
have continued to take  proportionally more  antidumping actions against developing countries than their
share of international trade.
There  are two  fundamental  problems,  which  unless  addressed, will  undermine  any  future  efforts to
provide  developing countries with meaningful differential treatment by developed countries either in the
context of market access or in the context of 'more  favourable treatment'.  The first is that developing
countries  capacity to  export and  compete in international  markets  is vastly different, as  their recent
record of increased penetration in developed country markets has demonstrated (WTO,  1999a).  Hence,
their  need  for  assistance  in  breaking  into foreign  markets is  also  very  different. Yet,  WTO  rules
regarding the  treatment  of  developing  countries by  developed  countries  is  in most  cases  identical.18
Singapore and Korea are supposed  to be treated the same way as Ghana and Saint Lucia; Argentina and
Brazil the same as the  Maldives and Senegal.
The Enabling Clause provisions incorporate the principle of graduation as well as referenceto developing
country contributions to liberalisation according to their level of development. Developing countrieshave
been treated differently by developed countries in the latter's  unilateral implementation of GSP. There is
very  little economic  reason to suggest that some of the more developed of the  developing  countries
cannot compete in the products in which they have comparative advantage with developed countries.And
there is very little political support for extending preferences to them. Indeed, protectionist  interests in
developed countries frequently succeed in discriminating against them on products in which they  enjoy
comparative advantage. But there is no formal differentiation imbedded in the WTO agreements. Leaving
the definition  to  the  individual  choices  of developed countries  invites the  introduction  of extraneous
17 For a recent  review see Ongulgo,  1999.
la  There are two sets  of exceptions:  The LDCs are treated  differently  as a group;  and in subsidies  a special  per capita
income  cut off has been established.
25political considerations  in the determination  of which countries  get which preferences and how much.
Unless  developing  countries  accept  some type of differentiation  in their treatment  beyond  that involved in
LDCs, there is very little prospect  that meaningful  commitments  favouring  all developing  countries  on a
general basis can be implemented  in the WTO  context.  But this poses  tremendous  political difficulties  in
the developing  countries  themselves.  Developing  countries  find it politically  easier  to pretend  that they all
should be treated the same; and developed  countries  pretend  to provide  more favourable  treatment to all
developing  countries,  but in practice  primarily  do so in the context of special regional  arrangements-not
as part  of the GSP, and only under specially  circumscribed  conditions,  which  they define.
There  is one precedent  for differentiation  on a per capita income  basis incorporated  in the export  subsidies
agreement  (see above). Developing  countries attempted to expand this definition to include all Lower
Middle Income Countries in the most recent Seattle Third WTO Ministerial. From the development
standpoint  there is little  justification for providing  lower income developing  countriesor the LDCs with
greater flexibility to subsidise exports:  given the budgetary  constraints  these countries face, it could be
argued that export subsidies  may result in  a very bad allocation  of scarce revenues.  But the principle  of
using a per capita income cut-off  point is of importance  and could be pursued in other, more appropriate
aspects  of S&D  treatment.
Also, in the preparation  of the recent Ministerial,  there were suggestions,  especially  by the World Bank
and the IMF  that improved market access benefits being considered for the LDCs be extended to
countries  eligible under the HIPIC debt reduction initiative.  These countries arguably  had as much need
of these  benefits as LDCs.
Both of these initiatives  came to naught  with the failure of the Ministerial.  But the failure of these efforts
and others of a similar nature also underscore  a basic problem in the  developed  countries response to
S&D  proposals  which involve  improved  market  access  for developing  countries: they do so, not so much
by reference  to whether a particular  proposal  has developmental  merit but,  on the basis of the potential
'cost'  they will have to face in terms additional imports from developing countries. Thus, they are
prepared  to accept  export subsidies  from LDCs almost indefinitely, as such subsidies may not cause
serious  problems  to their own domestic industries,  not because  it makes  sense forLDCs to promote  their
exports through  budget  subsidies.
The other problem is the one of coherence.  Developed  countries  have had serious  difficulties  in including
trade assistance measures,  even to developing  countries  that truly deserve them, as part of the overall
26measures of assistance to developing countries,  consistent with the basic premise under which S&D
treatment  is supposed  to be extended.  Of  course  the problem  is compounded  when the preferential  market
access or other preferential treatment is supposed  to be extended indiscriminately  and include even
advanced  developing  economies  whose  capacity  to compete  in international  markets  is not in doubt.
Technical Assistance. The  bulk of  the  effort in  technical assistance has  fallen on  international
organisations,  although some bilateral donors have active programs as well.  In the early 1990's,
assistance  in the trade field declined  significantly  from some  donor  agencies,  e.g. UNDP.  In the case of the
World  Bank,  the focus on trade development  in general declined  by comparison  to the late 1980's  and early
1990's.  But the Bank in the summer of  1999 issued a statement urging the 'mainstreaming'  of trade
assistance  in all its operations  ( World Bank, 1999a  ).  The WTO on the other hand, has increased  its
technical  co-operation  activities. But the bulk of the financing  for  these activities,  perhaps  as much as 90%
in any given year, is funded  by trust funds  provided  by two-three  bilateral donors,  while the WTO  itself
typically allocates  for technical co-operation  activities  less than one per cent of its total annual budget,
amounting  to less  than half  million  US dollars.
A systematic review of the assistance efforts of the international community in  support of trade
development  in developing  countries  is beyond  the scope of this paper. Some of the issues arising  in the
context of assistance  of LDCs  however,  are worth noting  not only because  the LDCs  face the most acute
problems  of effective  participation  in world trade WTO are most acute, but also because of their wider
applicability  to other low income.  developing  countries.
In order  to help address  some of the problems  faced  by the Least  Developed  Countries,  the Meeting  adopted
an Integrated  Framework  (IF) for trade related technical assistance  to support  LDCs. The Framework
envisages  the preparation  of needs assessments  for technical  assistance  by the  LDCs themselves  which are
then discussed  at Roundtables  with the six agencies  involved  in the effort  (IMF, ITC, UNDP,  UNCTAD,
World  Bank and WTO) plus other  interested  donors,  in order  to develop  an integrated  program  of technical
assistance  activities  which focus  primarily  on institution  building.  Progress  in implementing  the Framework
has been slow, for a variety of reasons.  According  to a recent report  (WTO, 2000), developing  countries
expect  the process  to result  both in improved  delivery  of assistance  as well as increased  amounts  of funding,
while  the donors  focus on the efficiency  gains  and synergies  resulting  from better co-ordination.  Difficulties
in co-ordination  both within the recipients and among the agencies have also emerged; and the very
problems of institutional  weaknesses  in LDCs that the initiative  is designed to address appear to have
27contributed to  implementation delays. A review of the IF by the six international agencies concerned is
scheduled for the first half of 2000.
Beyond the Integrated Framework, there are several other issues linked to assistance: (a) problems of the
LDCs are shared by other low income developing countries, and the differences are primarily a matter of
degree.; (b) helping LDCs and other low income countries strengthen their institutional capacity to even
permit them  to  meet their  WTO obligations will require not only technical  assistance, but substantial
amounts of financial assistance as well as the costs  for implementing WTO agreements are very substantial
(Finger and Schuler, 1999); (c) the commitments to technical assistance made in the WTO by developed
country members are neither concrete nor specific, and hence they can not be questioned as to whether they
have been met.
Flexibility  and  Reciprocity.  Regarding  the  matter  of  flexibility  in  the  implementation  of  WTO
commitments, the 1990's have witnessed a growing body of analytical and empirical work which suggests
that the very exercise by the developing countries of some of their rights under the various provisions that
exempt them from WTO disciplines, has had negative effects  on their trade and development prospects.' 9
As in the 1980's there are two distinct lines of inquiry which reach this conclusion: the first suggests that
developing countries by not participating in the exchange of reciprocal reductions in trade  barriers have
missed the opportunity of gaining reductions in the trade barriers in developed countries on  products of
specific export interest to them-- as evidenced by the fact that tariffs of developed countries on manufactures
of special interest to the developing countries are higher than average (Martin & Winters, 1996;  Hertel &
Martin 1999).
The second  line of thinking that has evolved and gained increasing acceptance attacks the very premise
on  which  exceptions  from  WTO  disciplines  is  based,  namely  that  higher  levels  of  protection  and
subsidisation  of  exports  are  conducive  to  development.  According  to  this  line  of  thinking,  the
permissiveness  of WTO  provisions  has enabled  developing  countries  to  maintain  higher  levels  of
domestic  protection.  But this  protection  has introduced  distortions  in  domestic  resource allocation,
encouraged  rent  seeking  and  waste  and  adversely  affected  growth  in  productivity  and  sustainable
development. Similarly, that  balance of payments problems are best addressed through macroeconomic
policy,  including  exchange  rate  adjustments  which  does  not  have  the  adverse  effects  on  resource
allocation  and  productivity  created  by  protection. And,  export  subsidies--  often  used to  offset  the
9See  Finger  and Winters  (1997);  Srinivasan  (1998).
28disincentives of protection --are a drain to the budget, and hence are not affordable, and can not be relied
upon to provide  sustainable export growth. These analyses depend both on theoretical arguments and on
evidence that  suggests that  countries with more open economies and  lower  levels of protection have
succeeded in attaining higher rates of export and GNP growth. 20
In a similar vein,  other analyses suggest that the developing countries that would benefit the most from
the  Uruguay Round are those that have  reduced their barriers the  most, partly  because of  improved
market access opportunities through the exchange of reciprocal reduction of barriers  and partly because
of the positive effects of their own lower protection on their economies. The broad  conclusion that is
drawn from  these  analyses is that  greater  discipline  in the  context of the  WTO,  which  would  lead
developing countries  to  adopt policies that would lower  protection, would tend  to  result in greater
benefits to their trade and development.21
The  findings linking  lower  protection to  faster development  continue  to  be controversial,  especially
regarding the direction of causality (Rodrik, 1992, Edwards, 1993). Also, there have been clear concerns
that trade liberalisation needs to be accompanied by efforts to strengthen domestic factor markets as well
as the establishment of appropriate safety nets to mitigate its short term adjustment costs (Stiglitz, 1999).
Moreover,  where  markets  are  not functioning  properly-for  example  in  rural  areas  of  low  income
countries, appropriate government interventions and supports may  be needed to  stimulate agricultural
production  and  rural  incomes-  which  would  have  implications for  example  for  the  maintenance  of
appropriate S&D provisions in the Agreement on Agriculture (Michalopoulos, 1999b)  2
Notwithstanding these  modifications, there is still a consensus  that the establishment of market based
policies and systems are critical for development and that govemment intervention is only justified when
there is market failure. But the optimal  government interventions in such circumstances typically do not
include higher protection through restrictive  trade  or exchange measures  or export subsidisation, as
alternative government  measures  are usually  available  which  are  less distortive. As a  consequence,
developing countries have been liberalising their trade regimes, even faster than their commitments under
20For a major  review  of this literature  see Edwards,  1993;  also  Dean  et.al. 1994;  Dollar,  1992;  Sachs, 1997;  Drabek  and
Laird 1998;  Papageorgiou  et al (1991)  summarises  the experiences  of another  group  of studies  of developing  countries
done in  the 1980's  under  the auspices  of the World  Bank  and  comes  to similar  conclusions.
21Finger  and  Winters,  (1997).
22  In a recent submission  in the context  of the preparations  for the WTO Third Ministerial,  Venezuela  asked for
'policy  spaces'  involving  market  oriented  "supply  policies"  to be imbedded  in the WTO  rules; but the proposal  was
not specific  regarding  the policies  advocated  (WT/GClW/279).
29the UR would warrant. This is manifested by the wide divergence between currently applied and bound
tariffs  and  in  the  reduction  on  reliance  on  export  subsidies  as  a  vehicle  for  export  promotion
(Michalopoulos 1999b).
Ceiling  bindings  introduce  flexibility  in  country  trade  policy, but  pose two  sets  of  problems:  first,
domestically,  in the country imposing them, they are an invitation toparticular  interest groups to exert
pressure on governments to increase protection. Second,  for foreign suppliers they reduce predictability
and increase uncertainty in terms of the market access barriers they will be facing.  This in turn impedes
the activity of private agents, especially where investments are marked by a degree of irreversibility,  and
could  result  in reduced  inflows  of  foreign  financing. At  the  same  time,  their  widespread existence,
undermines developing  country arguments that their development requires  intrinsically higher levels of
protection than those agreed in the WTO. Perhaps the greatest usefulness of ceiling bindings at present is
that they can be bargained away in a new Round of negotiations on non-agricultural tariffs in exchange
for  developed  country  concessions  that  would  improve  developing  country  market  access
(Michalopoulos 1999a).
Similarly, with export subsidies; experience in a number of countries suggests that they  are frequently
needed  to offset incentives to sell to the domestic market created through protection. But when protection
is  relatively  low  and  the  exchange rate  not overvalued,  subsidies tend  to  be  an  expensive  way  of
promoting exports whose main impact is to provide additional profits to established exporters.
In sum, there is little analytical and empirical justification that trade policies in developed and developing
countries should differ in principle; and hence that there should be a differential treatment of developing
countries regarding trade policy.
30There is however, increasing recognition that institutions in developing countries, including those that are
supposed to implement trade policies, are  weaker and need to be strengthened. In addition, supply side
constraints  create  important  impediments  to  participate  effectively  in  international  trade.  The  most
extensive evidence regarding trade  related  institutional inadequacies and  supply side  constraints have
been  developed  in the  context of  LDCs,  on which  the  international community  has been  focusing
increasing attention following the WTO agreements.
Transition Periods. Many  developing countries, including but not limited to LDCs,  have experienced
difficulties  in  implementing  WTO  agreements on  safeguards, subsidies  and  countervailing  measures,
Anti-Dumping,  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade,  Sanitary  and  Phytosanitary  Measures,  and  TRIPS.
Developing countries facing fiscal constraints  often have few resources to direct  towards the areas  of
public  administration  responsible  for  overseeing  and  co-ordinating  the  implementation  of  WTO
agreements, which are quite costly. These difficulties were supposed to be overcome through  technical
assistance and longer transition periods. But as with technical assistance or offers of many other elements
of S&D,  the  transition  time  periods appear to have  been  negotiated  without  much  involvement  of
developing countries officials  familiar with how long it takes to build institutional capacity where it was
inadequate or totally lacking. A very careful look at these transition periods is needed in all the areas in
which they have been extended on the grounds of institutional weakness.
A number of these transition periods have expired at  1999 while many developing countries have been
suggesting  that  they  are  experiencing  difficulties  in  establishing  the  institutions  needed  for  their
implementation.  Developed  countries  have  been  responding  in  the  WTO  that  they  are  prepared  to
consider waivers but on a case by case basis. This on the face of it should be unobjectionable, as indeed
different developing countries have differing institutional capacities. However, if each of the, let us say,
eighty  or more developing  countries which  may truly  have a problem in meeting the timetable  of its
commitments were to have its case considered individually, this would tie up the proceedings of the WTO
for  months.  At  the  same  time,  blanket  extensions  for  all  developing  countries  including the  most
advanced which may not need them, would also not appear appropriate. Clearly a different approach is
needed in this  and other aspects of S&D where  not all developing countries are treated the  same, but
which at the same time does not result in bogging down the work of the whole organisation.
Least  Developed  Countries.  The  international  community  has  made  a  special  effort  to  address  the
problems faced by the LDCs. The Integrated Framework initiative has been discussed above. LDCs are
31exempted completely from disciplines or  are provided with more extended transition periods to
implement agreements. Moreover, developed countries ( and other developing countries) have made
additional  preferential  market-access  commitments  for LDCs. Overall,  it is estimated  that between  80 to
90 per cent of the value of LDC merchandise  exports of  LDCs have duty free access in their main
developed  country markets. This implies that tariff measures  do not pose a significant  problem on the
existing structure  of LDC exports.  At the Third WTO Ministerial,  lhere  were  indications  that developed
countries may be prepared to go further in extending voluntary  GSP to these countries, perhaps even
offering  a commitment  to duty free access  to all LDC exports as part of new Round. Such commitments
are relatively easy to make in political economy terms, as LDCs account for very small fractions of
developed  country  imports in most product  categories. 3 As a consequence  LDCs may not have to 'offer'
any new liberalising  commitments,  in order to obtain improved  market access.
On the other hand, an evaluation  of the LDC needs assessments  prepared  under  the Integrated  Framework
suggests,  that the main  constraints  to LDC export expansion  derive primarily  not from market access
problems  but from weaknesses  in institutional  capacities  as well as other  supply  side factors  ( WTO, 1998).
In particular,  these include (i) infrastructure  deficiencies  such as erratic power supply, underdeveloped
telecommunication  networks, and the poor condition of terrestrial, sea and  air transport links; (ii)
weaknesses in  technological capacity; 24  (iii)  underdeveloped  financial and banking systems; (iv)
shortfalls  in a broad range skills and institutional  capacity  needed to participate  in international  trade as
well as to implement  effective  trade policies;  (v) deficient  regulatory  regimes  that are unable  to cope with
weakness  in the operations  of markets. 25
Thus,  the key issues  for S&D in the LDCs  is how  to ensure  concrete  and effective  support  for trade-related
capacity  building measures in practically  all areas linked to international  trade. At the same time, it is
important for LDCs to  recognise some of the implications and pitfalls of  past developing country
experience  with flexibility  in the application  of WTO rules and disciplines:  it could  be argued  for example,
that  existing S&D provisions  permit  LDCs  the most freedom  of policy choice  possible, in  areas such as
23 Even  so,  some  developed  countries  balked  at  making  such  a commitment,  apparently  because  of concerns  about  a
protectionist  backlash  in the  textile  sector.
24 The  GATS attempted  to address  the  question  of deficiencies  in technology  by providing,  through  Article  IV:  1,
for the  strengthening  of the domestic  service  capacity  efficiency  and  competitiveness  by amongst  other  things  the
provision  of access  to technology  on a commercial  basis,  and improvement  of access  to distribution  channels  and
networks. LDC Members maintain that this provision has not been sufficiently implemented.
25 Based  on  responses  to needs  assessment  questionnaire,  as  recorded  in WTO,  1998.
32subsidies, that they can least afford. Tighter WTO  disciplines in some policy areas may be helpful to LDC
governments that wish to introduce and gain domestic consensus for trade policy reform.
VI. Conclusions  and Priorities  for the Future
This analysis and  assessment of the S&D provisions in the WTO  agreements suggests the  need for  a
fundamental reorientation of priorities both by developed and developing country members of the WTO.
There are two major conclusions that are arise from the analysis: first there is increasing recognition that
institutions in many developing countries, including those that are supposed to implement trade  policies
and  bear  the  costs  of adjustment  to  globalisation,  are  weak  and  inadequate  to  cope  with  WTO
obligations.  In  addition,  supply  side  constraints  create  important  impediments  to  many  developing
countries'  effective integration in international trade. The most extensive evidence regarding trade related
institutional  inadequacies and  constraints has been  developed in the context of LDCs; but other low
income  developing  countries  suffer  from  similar  inadequacies.  And  this  conclusion  has  major
implications about the need to continue and emphasise certain dimensions of S&D. But  there  is much
less analytical and empirical justification that trade policies in developed and developing countries should
differ in principle.
The second  major  conclusion  is that the  GATTWTO  agreements have  fostered  a  'pretend'  culture
regarding S&D. Developing countries find it politically easier to pretend that they all should be treated
the same, with the exception of the LDCs; and developed countries pretend to provide meaningful S&D
but in practice their commitments are not legally enforceable either on market access, or on preferential
treatment  or  on  technical  assistance.  Developing  countries'  capacity  to  export  and  compete  in
international markets  is vastly different, as  their recent  record of  increased penetration  in developed
country markets has demonstrated.  Hence their need for preferential treatment or assistance in breaking
into foreign markets as well as their institutional capacities are vastly different. Yet with the exceptionof
LDCs,  treatment of developing countries by developed countries under the WTO  is not systematically
differentiated and  there is no general and effective graduation policy.
Developing countries have  been  treated differently  by  developed countries in  the  latter's  unilateral
implementation of GSP. Leaving the definition to the individual choices  of developed countries invites
the  introduction  of  extraneous  considerations  in  the  determination  of  which  countries  get  which
preferences  and how  much. Unless  developing  countries accept some type  of differentiation  in their
33treatment beyond that involved in LDCs,  as well as some type of graduation, there is very little prospect
that meaningful, legally enforceable  commitments favouring all developing countries on a general basis
can be implemented in the WTO context.
The overall objective of the international community should be a more meaningful and real provision of
S&D  treatment  through  appropriate  instruments  to  countries  that  truly  need  it.  The  conceptual
underpinnings of the  reorientation should be provided by the evolving understanding of the links between
trade  and  development  and  the  constraints faced  by  different developing  countries  in their  effective
integration in the international trading system. This  had been done  in the past in both the GATT and the
WTO. It needs to continue in the future. The main elements of the reorientation of priorities are as follows:
1. Greater  emphasis on  instruments to  strengthen developing country institutional capacity.  The main
differences between developed and developing countries are not in the trade policies they should pursue but
in the capacities of their institutions to pursue them. This means that S&D provisions related to technical
and financial assistance as well as longer transition periods (which are linked to institutional reform and
capacity building) should be emphasised.
2. Explicit  legally binding commitments  regarding technical and financial assistance need to obtained,
especially  as  it  relates  to  capacity  to  implement  commitments  related  to  WTO  agreements.  Legal
obligations developing countries have assumed  in the WTO  agreements need to  be  balanced by  legal
commitments of the developed countries to fund the assistance needed to  implement them.  One way of
doing this is through a large expansion of the WTO budget for technical co-operation.
3. All the transition periods in the WTO Agreements linked to developing country  institutional capacity
weaknesses need to be re-examined. A number of these transition periods have already expired and need to
be urgently addressed. The re-examination  should be done in terms of broad groups of developing countries.
Both  developed and  developing countries need to move from their present positions:  the developing
countries should abandon the myth  that all of them are equally incapable of meeting  WTO commitments;
while the developed countries should abandon the request for case by case determination. One possibility
would be to extend  transition periods for all low and lower middle income countries (based on the World
Bank definition) while considering the rest on a case by case basis. The review of the transition periods
needed should also include panels of experts from governments and appropriate international institutions
knowledgeable of capacity building efforts and requirements in the respective areas.
344. Less emphasis should be placed on  S&D provisions which provide developing countries with greater
flexibility to protect their domestic markets or subsidise their exports of goods and services  This does not
mean that markets in developing countries are assumed to work or that more liberal trade policies have no
costs. Rather that  government interventions, other than through border trade measures,  are usually more
suitable and  available; and that 'flexibility'  in trade policy has both costs and benefits. It also implies e.g.
that developing countries should bind industrial tariffs close to their applied levels-as  part of a new round
of negotiations; but  they should be very careful in maintaining flexibility of support to agriculture, many of
which previously penalised it.
5. A sharper differentiation of developing countries  There are many  problems of institutional capacity
which  are common to LDCs and  other low  income developing countries with  limited participation  in
international trade, but which are not faced by more advanced developing countries. Per capita income
and/or share of world trade indicators need to be introduced to expand the focus of assistance to capacity
building  as  well  as  'more  favourable  treatment'  and  market  access  by  developed  countries to  these
developing countries, but which would exclude more advanced developing countries. Without a graduation
policy which would permit a narrower definition of which countries should be eligiblefor  S&D, developed
countries would:  (a) continue to make commitments to developing countries in  general which are not
concrete; (b) make concrete commitments only to LDCs which have a very small share of world trade; (c)
rely on their own criteria-frequently  non-transparent and  politically motivated-in  the determination of
which countries to provide more favourable treatment or market access.
Differentiation and graduation will be difficult for developing countries to accept. Substantial differentiation
however, exists regarding financial flows from all  IFIs and even from the  IJNDP.  In the case of the World
Bank, some developing countries get no assistance at all, others are only eligible for loans on hard terms
others for soft loans, and still others for a mix. 26Why  can the principle  which has been accepted without
serious difficulty on issues of finance not be acceptable regarding trade? It may be difficult to do, but an
effort needs to be made.
26 The principle  has also  been accepted  in the establishment  of the 'Advisory  Centre on WTO Law', an international
institution  established  in Geneva,  Switzerland  to assist  developing  countries  pursue cases in the context of the WTO
dispute  settlement  mechanism.
356. Avoid efforts aimed at 'Permnanently  Binding"  preferential  margins of GSP or similar arrangements.
Preference  margins,  including in agriculture  where protection  is currently  very highX  can be expected  to
decline  over time as tariffs are liberalised  on an MFN basis; and no S&D provisions  should inhibit this
liberalisation.  One way  to help developing  countries  that truly  need  assistance  in breaking  into foreign
36markets  is to exclude  from giving  preferences  to developing  countries  which  do not need  it; also, by helping
them strengthen  their institutional  capacity  and reduce  supply  side  constraints.
7. Promote  transparency  in the provision  of S&D by mandating  a regular  review  of S&D implementation.
This could be done through  a systematic annual  review  ( Whalley,  1999)  which reviews  donor assistance
commitments  and other  measures  taken in favour  of developing  countries.  Alternative,  a similar systematic
review  could  be undertaken  on a country  by  country  basis  in the context  of the TPR  mechanism.
8. Promote Greater Policy Coherence Between S&D provisions in the WTO and other International
Initiatives and Organisations.  While the WTO has established  co-operative  relations with many other
international  organisations,  including  the UIN  organisations  and the  IFIs, there is a need for greater policy
coherence  at the level of the individual  Members  and for particular  initiatives.  One example  of such a need
is to relate  the international  initiative  on debt  reduction  for highly  indebted  low income  countries  (H[PIC)  to
market access  initiatives  for the (LDCs).  Arguably  the countries  on the H1PIC  list have as much need to
improve  their market access  as the LDCs.  The two lists of countries  overlap  to a considerable  extent and
they should  be combined.  At the same  time, trade related  issues  and support  for trade related  infrastructure
should be  more effectively 'mainstreamed'  in the operations of the World Bank and the regional
development  banks, especially  in Africa  and other low income  countries  which face institutional  capacity
constraints  to more  effective  integration  in the world  economy.
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